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DEVELOPERS' VESTED RIGHTS
Modern, mixed use, multistage developments cost millions of dol-
lars and take years to complete.' Before a developer commits re-
sources irretrievably he wants assurances that he will be able to
complete such a project.2 Conversely, municipal officials wish to re-
serve a veto power for as long as possible to protect against unfore-
seen threats to the public welfare.3 At some point between the
application for a permit and the final stages of construction, the de-
veloper acquires a "vested right" 4 to complete the project and gov-
1. See, e.g., Snake River Venture v. Board of County Comm'rs., 616 P.2d 744
(Wyo. 1980) (developer purchased 50.7 acres for $225,044.44 in 1972 and had spent
$56,422.74 in formulating development plan by time of suit); Oceanic Cal., Inc. v.
North Cent. Coast Regional Comm'n, 63 Cal. App. 3d 57, 133 Cal. Rptr. 664 (1976)
(developer purchased 5,200 acres in 1963 and expended $26,900,000 in development
prior to seeking a building permit); DeKalb County v. Chapel Hill, Inc., 232 Ga. 238,
205 S.E.2d 864 (1974) (developer purchased 1,078 acres in 1962 and expended $50,000
in developing lake and recreation area).
2. See Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17
Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977)
(where county zoning ordinance required developer to satisfy all governmental re-
quirements before a building permit would issue, newly enacted California Coastal
Zone Conservation Act caused denial of permit).
3. See, e.g., People v. County of Kern, 39 Cal. App. 3d 830, 115 Cal. Rptr. 67
(1974) (owner denied vested right to a permit despite investment of $45,000, where
county had not adequately addressed significant environmental objections raised by
public to owner's environmental impact statement).
4. The term is a powerful one that is often used in a conclusory manner that
preempts reasoned analysis. See, e.g., Trans-Oceanic Oil Corp. v. City of Santa Bar-
bara, 85 Cal. App. 2d 776, 784, 194 P.2d 148, 152 (1948) ("[lIf a permittee has ac-
quired a vested property right under a permit, the permit cannot be revoked."); see
also Cunningham & Kremer, Vested Rzghs, Estoppel, and the Land Development Pro-
cess, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 623, 640-41 (1978); J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETU-
ITIES 98 n.l (3d ed. 1915).
The development potential of land is not a property interest protected by the fifth
and fourteenth amendments. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978). See also 8 E. McQUILLEN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 25.157 (3d ed. 1976). Thus, there is no property right in an existing zoning classifi-
cation. Cf. Hadacheck v. Sebastion, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) ("A vested interest can-
not be asserted against [a land use regulation] because of conditions once
obtaining."). It is instead a privilege that a developer enjoys only after he has secured
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ernment loses the power to stop it.5 This section summarizes the
traditional vested rights tests,6 analyzes their inability to deal ade-
quately with multi-phase land use projects,7 and examines legislative
attempts to rationalize the multiple permit approval system.'
I. THE APPROVAL PROCESS
There is no common law right to develop land unimpeded.9 Ac-
cording to the accepted view, development is at best an inchoate
right, a mere potentiality that does not harden into a reality until
a permit on terms set by the municipality pursuant to its police power. See note 11
and accompanying text infra.
Few court cases discuss the constitutional dimensions of permit procedures. See C.
SIEMON, W. LARSEN, D. PORTER & W. WATTS, THE RIGHT TO DEVELOP: PROTECT-
ING DEVELOPMENT EXPECTATIONS BY VESTING RIGHTS 19 (July 1981) (unpublished
manuscript at Ross, Hardin, O'Keefe, Babcock & Parsons, Chicago, Ill. and The Ur-
ban Land Institute, Washington, D.C.); but see P. BUCK, MODERN CONTROL OF
LAND DEVELOPMENT 271-75 (1980). Instead, challenges to permit revocations pro-
ceed on an estoppel theory. The developer argues that he has reasonably relied on a
government act-the issuance of a permit-to his detriment. See notes 40-43 and
accompanying text infra. If the developer can show sufficient good faith reliance on
the permit, the city will be estopped from revoking it and the court will declare that a
right to develop has vested. Thus, the courts use an equitable doctrine to bridge the
legal abyss and establish a protected development right despite the settled rule that
the development of land is not a constitutionally protected property interest.
5. See text at notes 40-52 infra.
6. See text at notes 53-121 infra.
7. See text at notes 122-133 infra.
8. See text at notes 134-141 infra.
9. The idea that rights in land are rooted in a natural law, eroded by the judicial
interest in the public welfare, may nevertheless have a basis in reality. I R. POWELL,
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 91-135 (1977). Bosselman terms this the "American
fable or myth that a man can use his land anyway he pleases regardless of his neigh-
bors." F. BOSSELMAN, THE TAKING ISSUE 318-19 (1973). The romanticized ideal
lives on, however. See, e.g., Kitmar Builders, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 439
Pa. 466, 478-81, 268 A.2d 765, 771 (1970) (concurring opinion of Bell, C.J.); TASK
FORCE ON LAND USE AND URBAN GROWTH, THE USE OF LAND 140 (1973).
The physical presence of land may underlie its special place in our folklore: "The
fact that tangible property is also visible tends to give rigidity to our conception of our
rights in it that we do not attach to others less concretely clothed." Justice Holmes in
Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921). See also 3 P. SIMKO, PROMISED LANDS:
SUBDMSIONS AND THE LAW 9 (1978); Berger, To Regulate or Not to Regulate, Is that
the Question? Reflections on the Supposed Dilemma Between Environmental Protectlon
andPrivate PropertyRights, 8 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 253, 265 (1975) (finding deep psycho-
logical origins for the territorial instinct that leads citizens to oppose government con-
trols on land use).
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catalyzed by government's permission to build."0
A building permit" certifies that a project satisfies all the substan-
tive and procedural safeguards designed to protect the public wel-
fare.' 2 Simple Euclidean zoning systems are meant to be self-
executing. 3 The criteria for securing a permit are largely objective;
hence, the issuance of a permit is a ministerial function. 4 Once a
developer meets all the criteria imposed by a governmental unit, the
building commissioner' 5 must issue the permit as of right.' 6 The de-
10. Since the Supreme Court upheld the regulation of land use by zoning in Vil-
lage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), courts have come to regard
the restrictions imposed by zoning laws on land use as common knowledge. See
HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S 904 (1976) (possibility of change in classification inherent in
zoning law, hence forseeable by purchasers of property); 8 E. McQUILLIN, supra note
4, at §§ 25.147, -.150, -.152.
11. Permits required by zoning ordinances are administrative devices. 8 E. Mc-
QUILLIN, supra note 4, at § 25.147. They derive from the general municipal police
power authority to license and regulate business activity, which predates zoning. Id
at § 25.152. See also San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d
205, 529 P.2d 70, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974), appeal dismissed, 427 U.S. 901 (1976)
(discounting idea that a permit to develop land is any different from a license to
conduct a business).
Authorities diverge on whether a building permit is personal or runs with the land.
Compare Brougher v. Board of Pub. Works, 205 Cal. 426,271 P. 487 (1928) (permit is
a personal privilege) and Brett v. Building Comm'r of Brookline, 250 Mass. 73, 145
N.E. 269 (1924) (same) with Cohn v. County Bd. of Supervisors of Los Angeles
County, 135 Cal. 2d 180, 286 P.2d 836 (1955) (special use permits run with land) and
3 A. RATHKOPF, LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 55-13 (4th ed. 1975) (building per-
mits run with land). See also 101A C.J.S. Zoning § 221 (1979) (discussing both
views).
12. Early zoning regulations were an outgrowth of nuisance laws. Their aim was
to protect property values. 3 P. SIMKO, supra note 9, at 11.
13. Eg., Bills v. Township of Grand Blanc, 59 Mich. App. 619, 229 N.W.2d 871
(1975) (determination that the use met appliable zoning standards sufficient to insure
the public welfare, no further review needed or allowed).
14. Palmer v. Fox, 118 Cal. App. 2d 453, 258 P.2d 30 (1958) (persons employed by
city to process applications and issue permits have no right to withhold a building
permit after realty owners had complied with prerequisites for its issuance). See 8 E.
MCQUILLAN, supra note 4, at § 25.147 n.12; 3 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 11, at 55-3.
15. The position goes by many titles, e.g., building inspector, building engineer,
and zoning administrator. The commissioner's authority is limited to determining
whether a proposed project conforms to the applicable zoning. 101A C.J.S. Zoning
§ 193 (1979). The commissioner may not withhold a permit because the proposed use
violates some other ordinance, 8 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 4, at § 25.149, because he
feels it is unnecessary or unwise, 101A C.J.S. Zoning § 178 (1979), or because he
anticipates added requirements due to a pending change in the zoning ordinance,
Mattson v. City of Chicago, 89 11l. App. 3d 378, 381, 411 N.E.2d 1002, 1005 (1980).
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veloper whose project does not conform to applicable zoning laws,
however, must submit to discretionary review by a board of zoning
appeals or the city legislative body. 7
Discretionary review underlies the subdivision review process, as
well." Subdivision approval is a two-step process.' 9 Preliminary ap-
The role is further defined at R. BURCHELL & J. HUGHES, PLANNED UNIT DEVELOP-
MENT: NEW COMMUNITIES, AMERICAN STYLE 24 (1972).
16. 8 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 4, at § 25.147, n.13; see also, General Baking Co.
v. Board of Street Comm'rs, 242 Mass. 194, 196-97, 136 N.E. 245, 246 (1922) (once a
builder has complied with permit requirements, he may claim protection until further
legislation impairs his rights); accord Shapiro v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 377 Pa.
621, 105 A.2d 299 (1954).
17. Where a proposed use does not comply with zoning requirements, the land-
owner may seek a variance. A variance is an extraordinary device whereby an appli-
cant asks to be excused from complying with zoning requirements because unique
problems inherent in his land make it unfit for a permissible use. 101A C.J.S. Zoning
§§ 229(a), 234 (1979). A local zoning board of adjustment or other quasi-judicial
body reviews applications on a discretionary, case-by-case basis to minimize potential
conflicts between the proposed use and the public welfare. Id at §§ 181, 183. See
Otto v. Steinhilber, 282 N.Y. 71, 24 N.E.2d 851 (1939) rearg denied, 282 N.Y. 681, 26
N.E.2d 811 (1940), for a frequently cited discussion of the criteria used in the review.
See also Green, The Power of the Zoning Board ofAdj ustment to Grant Variancesfrom
the Zoning Ordinance, 29 N.C. L. REv. 245, 249 (1951).
A special use permit is a legislative control device. It allows such things as gas
stations and churches, which are necessary to every community but can be detrimen-
tal to their immediate neighborhood. Such uses are only permitted after a finding
that they meet specific criteria set out in the zoning ordinance. See 101A C.J.S. Zon-
ing § 229(b) (1979). See also Tullo v. Millburn Twp., 54 N.J. Super. 483, 149 A.2d
620 (1959) (criteria for schools, hospitals, clubs, community centers, and cemeteries).
See generally D. MANDELKER & R. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF
LAND DEVELOPMENT 655-74 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MANDELKER].
Variances and special use permits are generally held to be permissive rather than
mandatory; they issue only after discretionary review when a zoning board or the
legislative body determines that the proposed use poses no threat to the public wel-
fare. 101A C.J.S. Zoning § 235 (1979).
18. Zoning presupposes that the needs of the community have become suffi-
ciently crystalized to permit the enactment of specific regulations. Subdivision
control, on the other hand, establishes more general standards to be specifically
applied by an administrative body in order to insure that the change of use will
not be detrimental to the community.
Note, Land Subdivision Control, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1226, 1227 (1952).
There is no "right" to subdivide land. See note 4, supra. The prevailing rationale
states that because the developer reaps increased profits from subdivided land, he
should submit to reasonable police power requirements to pay for the added burdens
on community facilities his project will generate. MANDELKER, supra note 17, at 809-
11. See, e.g. Blevens v. City of Manchester, 103 N.H. 284, 286-87, 170 A.2d 121, 122-
23 (1961) (statute prohibiting subdivision from selling lots until streets were upgraded
to legal minimum held reasonable police power regulation).
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proval2° comes from the planning commission21 and begins a negoti-
ation process that continues until the commission grants final
approval,2" when the right to complete the project vests.2 3
Whereas subdivision controls relate only to residential develop-
ment, Planned Unit Development (PUD) ordinances cover mixed use
24projects. PUD approval merges ministerial zoning approval and
19. 4 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 11, at 71-34. See also, Western Land Equities,
Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388, 389 (Utah 1980) (subdivision approval process
outlined).
20. A preliminary plat is a disclosure statement that alerts the local government to
the broad outlines of a subdivision so it can begin considering the impact on the
community. Plat approval lets the owner finalize the street layout, water and sewer
lines and open space locations and begin construction on these. 4 A. RATHKOPF,
supra note 11, at 71-34.
The city may require modifications as conditions to final approval. Because a sub-
division creates a need for new local services that are of special value to the subdivi-
sion, the planning commission may reasonably require the builder to install his own
streets, water mains and sewage plants, and dedicate land for parks and schools. Id
at 71-51 to -59.
Courts uphold these exactions where they are attributable to new demand on the
grounds that the subdivider's land is made more valuable by the government's per-
mission to subdivide. 3 P. SIMKO, supra note 9, at 12-13. See also Sternlieb, Burchell,
Hughes & Listokin, Planned Unit Development Legislation: A Summary of Necessary
Considerations, 7 URBAN L. ANNq. 71, 75 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Sternlieb &
BurcheU].
21. 4 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 11, at 71-35 to -39. All states now have some form
of subdivision control. Every state but Florida gives the local legislature the power to
appoint a planning commission. Most states further authorize the locality to delegate
to the planning commission the power to approve subdivision plats. Other states re-
quire approval solely by the local legislative body, and a few require the approval of
both. Id at 71-15.
22. Final approval, of course, is not guaranteed. Unless a subdivision control en-
abling statute expressly provides for action on a preliminary plat within a specified
time, an anti-growth minded planning commission can withhold approval until a de-
veloper takes legal action. qf Gluckman v. Klipp, N.Y.L.J. 15 (April 9, 1963); aff'd
19 A.D.2d 777, 242 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (1963); aj'd 13 N.Y.2d 1122, 196 N.E.2d 554, 247
N.Y.S.2d 121 (1964).
On the other hand, failure to act promptly where a statute requires action in a
specified time may be deemed equivalent to approval of the developer's plans. Callen
v. Borg, 3 Wis. 2d 488, 89 N.W.2d 267 (1958) (failure of planning board to act within
stated time gave rise to presumption that plat conformed to city requirements); V1
Dover Twp. Homeowners & Tenants Ass'n v. Twp. of Dover, 114 N.J. Super. 270,
276 A.2d 156 (1971) (presumption did not arise where planning board did act within
the statutory sixty days but acted improperly). See also text at note 120 infra.
23. 4 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 11, at 71-34.
24. See R. BURCHELL & J. HUGHES, supra note 15, at 1, 34-38 for a definition and
brief summary of the PUD review process.
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discretionary subdivision review in a single, institutionalized bargain-
ing process.2 5 Because they progress in stages, with each stage requir-
ing separate approval26 by the city, PUD's maximize discretionary
review.27
Early zoning and subdivision control ordinances served to protect
property values by insuring the integrity of a local land use plan.
Larger and more complex projects, however, overwhelmed the scope
and sophistication of local regulatory authorities.21 State,29 re-
gional,30 and federal31 governments responded with modern land use
25. While this reduces the number of government entities a developer must deal
with, the number of separate approval hurdles may remain burdensome. Cunning-
ham & Kremer, supra note 4, at 647. Although discretionary review originally
evolved to overcome the restrictions of the rigid, self-determining standards of early
zoning enabling acts, see notes 12-14 supra, and note 27 infra, a government may now
impose the "option" of negotiation on the developer and use discretionary review as a
procedural roadblock rather than a device to achieve flexible, substantive review. J.
VRANICAR, W. SANDERS & D. MoSENA, Streamlining Land Use Regulation 5 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as HUD STUDY]. 3 P. SIMKO, supra note 9, at 89. See also note 32
infra.
26. Sternlieb & Burchell, supra note 20, at 93-94. See also R. BURCHELL & J.
HUGHES, supra note 15, at 45; 3 P. SIMKO, supra note 9, at 21-22; see also Youngblood
v. Board of Supervisors, 71 Cal. App. 3d 655, 664-69, 139 Cal. Rptr. 741, 745-48
(1977) (unmet planning requirements make it difficult to argue permit should issue as
of right).
27. The PUD concept grew out of innovative zoning devices that evolved to free
the subdivider from the constraints of lot-by-lot zoning. PUD ordinances therefore
resemble variances and special uses, as well as cluster zones and floating zones, in that
they are often characterized as quasi-legislative actions and hence qualify for a high
degree of discretionary review. See MANDELKER, supra note 17, at 861-62; Sternlieb
& Burchell, supra note 20, at 76-77. See, e.g., Todd Mart, Inc. v. Town Bd. of Web-
ster, 49 A.D.2d 12,370 N.Y.S.2d 683 (App. Div. 1975) (rezoning application for shop-
ping center denied on a "reasonableness" standard after comparing PUD's to special
use districts and floating zones and finding the approval process more legislative than
administrative).
28. 3 P. SIMKO, supra note 9, at 21-22.
29. For example, zoning has proved inadequate to protect Colorado's mountains
from recreation homes. The state has responded with three major land use statutes.
One requires that all subdivisions comply with regulations promulgated by the state
land use commission. COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-28-133 (1973 & Supp. 1981). In addi-
tion, the Colorado Land Use Act authorizes the designation of "areas of state inter-
est" where special building permits are required. Id §§ 24-65-101 to -65.1-502.
Finally, the Colorado Ground Water Management Act allows development control
by means of permits for the use of designated ground water. Id § 37-90-103. See 3
P. SIMKO, supra note 9, at 227-37.
30. In order to protect its coastal environment, California enacted the California
Coastal Act of 1976 (CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (Deering Supp. 1981)
(superseding California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972, CAL, PUn. RES.
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laws that seek to achieve many diverse objectives, from area-wide
environmental protection to historic preservation.32 Hence, the devel-
oper today faces an approval process that has grown from a one-step
nuisance control device into a multiple-permit approval system of
uncoordinated and overlapping veto points lodged in a variety of
agencies, each with its limited sphere of regulatory authority.33
These agencies may straddle several levels of government.34
CODE §§ 27000-27650 (Deering 1976)). The Act divides the state's coastline into six-
teen regions, id at §§ 30150-30174. The California Coastal Commission administers
the state's coastal plan, id at §§ 30300-30342. The Commission designates "sensitive
coastal resource areas," id at § 30502, and local governments must prepare a "local
coastal program," id at § 30500, for the protection of the designated areas. Any de-
velopment in the coastal zone must obtain a coastal development permit. Id at
§ 30600. Issuance of a permit may be appealed if the development fails to protect
public views, is not compatible with existing physical scale, or may significantly alter
natural land forms. Id § 30603. Developments must not significantly degrade envi-
ronmentally sensitive habitat areas. Id § 30240.
31. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (33 U.S.C.
§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979)) set out a permit program for pollution discharge
from point and nonpoint sources. Because the Act covers all water impacts, subdivi-
sion developers must obtain point source permits for well drilling that may lead to
saltwater intrusion and nonpoint source permits for surface runoff. The Act's 1977
amendments specifically direct the Army Corps of Engineers to prevent pollution
from dredging and filling via a permit system. Id § 1344(a). Permits are denied for
an "unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds, and fish-
ing areas,. . . or wildlife or recreational areas." Id § 1344(c).
Because the Corps is a federal agency, the dredge and fill permits it grants are
"major federal actions," 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1976) within the scope of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1970 (42 U.S.C. §§ 321-4347 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
Therefore, an environmental impact statement, id § 4332(c), is a prerequisite for
dredge and fill permits.
32. Large-scale developments require regulation for more than their impact on
adjacent property values. Subdivision controls are a vehicle for such objectives as
flood plain preservation, protection of ground water supply and purity, energy conser-
vation, comprehensive planning, protection of fragile ecosystems, consumer protec-
tion, coastland preservation, and the conservation of areas of historical and
archeological significance. See generally 3 P. SIMKO, supra note 9, at 77-137.
33. See F. BOSSELMAN, D. FEURER & C. SIEMON, THE PERMIT EXPLOSION 83-84
(1976) [hereinafter cited as BOSSELMAN] for a representative list of state, regional, and
local agencies which must review and approve various aspects of a project, and HUD
STUDY, supra note 25, at 26, for a typical permit checklist involving up to seventeen
steps.
34. See, e.g., The Florida Environmental Land & Water Management Act of 1972
(FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 380.012-.10 (West 1974 & Supp. 1982)). It declares develop-
ments which will affect the health, safety, or welfare of citizens in more than one
county to be "developments of regional impact," (DRI's). Id § 380.06(1).
The builder of a DRI must file an "application for development approval" with the
local government, the regional planning council, and the Division of State Planning.
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Securing all the required permits can take months and even years.
The vesting of a right to complete a modem, large-scale, mixed use
project tends, therefore, to occur late in the development process.
This deprives the developer of the certainty he needs for further busi-
ness planning.35
Model one-step PUD approval ordinances are one answer.36 In the
meantime, the modem developer must negotiate the permit maze
armed with several common law estoppel based defenses: he can ar-
gue that he has relied on the issuance of a permit, hence the govern-
ment is estopped from revoking it;37 he can try to compel approval of
the project on a nonconforming use theory;38 or he can argue that
because his project is a single entity, prior approval of one part of it
should vest a right to complete the whole.39
II. ZONING ESTOPPEL
Estoppel is a remedy whose origins are in equity.40 The doctrine
states that one party may not withhold promised performance when
it knows or should have known at the time it acted that another party
would rely on the promise to the latter's detriment.4 ' As courts apply
Id § 380.06(6). He must include detailed information on his project's impact on the
regional environment and natural resources, public facilities, and the economy. Id
§ 380.06(2)(a)-(f). The regional planning council makes its findings and then the local
government holds hearings and considers the application, the project, the regional
council's report, local land use regulations, and the relationship of the proposed pro-
ject to the state land development plan. Id § 308.06(7), (8), (1l)(a)-(c). The local
government may then deny, approve, or modify the proposal. Id § 308.06(1 1).
35. The results can be especially severe for the developer who has begun develop-
ment and must conform to new regulations not in existence when he began. See
Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 4, at 645.
36. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 2-210
(1976) [hereinafter cited as MODEL CODE].
37. See notes 49-51 and accompanying text infra.
38. See notes 110-121 and accompanying text infra.
39. See notes 122-28 and accompanying text infra.
40. 3 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 802, 804 (5th ed.
1941).
41. The doctrine of estoppel prevents a party from repudiating its prior represen-
tations. The vested rights doctrine, on the other hand, focuses on whether the devel-
oper has acquired a protectable property right in his project that will withstand a
change in government representations. Heeter, Zoning Estoppel, 1971 URBAN L.
ANN. 63, 64-65; P. BUCK, MODERN CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 261 (1980).
Confusion arises because the vesting point is measured by the equitable doctrine of
reliance. Id at 259. See also Town of Hillsborough v. Smith, 276 N.C. 48, 170 S.E.2d
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the doctrine to vested rights caseS42 it is more aptly termed "zoning
estoppel.
' 43
In the typical case, a municipality issues a building permit," then
decides to change the applicable zoning and attempts to revoke the
permit because the proposed structure does not meet the new zoning
standards.45 Although a permit must issue once a developer has met
all its requirements,46 the general rule is that a permit is revocable by
subsequent legislation and confers no immunity from a zoning
change.47
Although the rule serves the public welfare,48 it seems manifestly
unfair to the developer who has relied in good faith49 on a validly
904 (1969) (basis of builder's vested right to the permit issued him is the change of his
own position in bonafide reliance on the permit).
42. See 3 J. POMEROY, supra note 40, at § 805.
43. Heeter, supra note 41, formulates the rule as follows:
A local government exercising its zoning powers will be estopped when a prop-
erty owner, I) relying on good faith, 2) upon some act or omission of the gov-
ernment 3) has made such a substantial change in position or incurred such
extensive obligations and expenses that it would be highly inequitable and unjust
to destroy the rights which he obviously acquired.
Id at 66.
44. See note 11, supra, for a discussion of building permits. The discussion that
follows deal with single permits for single structures. The principles are the same,
however, for large scale, multi-stage projects and multiple permit approval systems.
45. 8 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 4, at § 25.156.
46. See notes 14 & 16 and accompanying text supra.
47.. Eg., Snake River Venture v. Board of County Comm'rs, 616 P.2d 744 (Wyo.
1980) (developer had no vested right to construct partially approved project where
approval was in violation of appellee board's own rules and developer had not com-
menced construction or entered into irrevocable contractual commitment). 3 A.
RATHKOPF, supra note 11, at § 57.2.
48. Eg., Town of Lebanon v. Woods, 153 Conn. 182, 215 A.2d 112 (1965) (land-
owner properly required to proceed in conformity with new ordinance where purpose
was to prevent overcrowding and allow space for water and sewer services).
Building permits are similar to professional licenses. If licensing requirements are
changed to reflect a new conception of the public interest, a practitioner who cannot
meet the new criteria should lose his license. See, e.g., Packer v. Board of Behavioral
Science Examiners, 52 Cal. App. 3d 190, 125 Cal. Rptr. 96 (1975) (upholding refusal
to renew license of marriage counselor without first meeting stiffened state licensing
requirements).
49. 3 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 11, at 57-26 (good faith of the developer is a
threshold requirement before estoppel will vest a right to a permit); 8 E. MCQUILLIN,
supra note 4, at § 25.157 ("[N)o estoppel for previous expenditure where not made in
good faith."). Compare City of Evanston v. Robbins, 117 Ill. App. 2d 278, 254 N.E.2d
536 (1969) (trial court refused to enforce zoning where owner expended $1,200 and
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issued permit." The majority of jurisdictions temper the rule by
evaluating the extent of the owner's reliance on the permit." Simply
put, the closer the project is to completion, the more substantial the
reliance, and the less equitable it is to revoke the permit pursuant to
subsequent changes in zoning.52
received written assurances from city officials that all violations had been corrected)
with Schneider v. Calabrese, 5 Pa. Commw. 444, 291 A.2d 326 (1972) (right to permit
did not vest where landowner began construction in spite of knowledge of pending
change in zoning).
50. Substantial reliance may also vest a right to a mistakenly issued permit as well
as a validly issued one. Compare Garnick v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Bridgeton Twp.,
58 Pa. Commw. 92, 427 A.2d 310 (1981) (permit issued under mistake of fact confers
no vested right despite reliance) and Appeal of Donofrio, 31 Pa. Commw. 579, 377
A.2d 1017 (1977) (permit issued under mistake of law confers no vested rights despite
reliance) with City of Northern Miami v. Margulies, 289 So. 2d 424 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1974) (city estopped from revoking conditional use permit where owner had
incurred substantial financial obligations in reliance thereon) and State ex rel S.A.
Lynch Corp. v.Darner, 159 Fla. 874, 33 So. 2d 45 (1948) (permit mistakenly issued
could not be revoked where construction had already begun).
Substantial reliance may vest a right due to reliance on the expectation of the per-
mit. Compare Mattson v. City of Chicago, 89 111. App. 3d 378, 411 N.E.2d 102 (1980)
(mandamus to compel issuance of building permit granted where owner demolished
existing structure in reliance on building department approval of proposed use) with
Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785,
553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977) (govern-
ment cannot be estopped to enforce laws enacted before building permit issued).
A municipality's acquiescence in a zoning violation may also create a vested right.
E.g. Appeal of Kates, 38 Pa. Commw. 145, 393 A.2d 499 (1978) (property owner
acquired vested right to zoning violation after apparent acquiescence of municipality
for twenty-one years).
51. 8 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 4, § 25.157 (substantial change of position, ex-
penditure or incurrence of obligation under a permit vests a right to complete the use
stated in the permit). See also 3 A. RATmIoPF, supra note 11, at 57-6, 57-7.
See, e.g., Petrosky v. Zoning Bd. of Upper Chichester Twp., 485 Pa. 501, 402 A.2d
1385 (1979) (vested right to use property in violation of setback requirements where
owner had expended $15,000 in reliance on permits).
52. As a rule of thumb, the farther out of the ground a structure is, the more likely
the courts are to allow its completion. Delaney & Kominers, Events Before the Start
of Construction, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 219, 240 (1979); Heeter, supra note 41, at 85
(majority of courts require physical construction to establish substantial reliance).
[Vol. 23:487
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol23/iss1/19
ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
III. ESTOPPEL BASED DEFENSES; JUDICIAL ATTEMPTS TO
ACCOMMODATE THE LARGE-SCALE, MULTISTAGE
DEVELOPMENT
A. Preconstruction Reliance
Nearly all courts will estop a city from revoking a permit once a
developer commences construction. 53 Many courts struggle, how-
ever, to make the estoppel rule yield just results when faced with the
significant reliance expenditures that occur long before the developer
breaks ground on a large-scale project.
54
The decisional law diverges on how much and what kinds of
preconstruction activity will work an estoppel. The mere purchase of
land is rarely enough to create a vested right to a subsequently issued
permit." Nevertheless, courts increasingly find reliance where a
builder has entered into financial agreements and construction con-
56 o usotracts, or spent irrecoverable sums on engineering and architectural
work.57 Thus, in Life of the Land, Inc. v. City Council,58 a nonprofit
corporation sought and received a variance to construct a housing
project. The developer obtained official assurances that it would be
able to complete its project and in reliance on the city council's ac-
tions spent $360,629.12 for planning and design work.-9 The
Supreme Court of Hawaii held that the developer's expenditures
53. See Heeter, supra note 41, at 85.
54. Id
55. See, e.g., Limekiln Golf Course, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Hor-
sham County, 1 Pa. Commw. 496, 276 A.2d 331 (1971) (purchase of land one of many
factors, not enough by itself); Stone Mountain Ind., Inc. v. Wilhite, 221 Ga. 269, 144
S.E.2d 357 (1965) (purchase of land not enough to create vested right).
Florida is an exception to the rule. See, e.g. Project Home, Inc. v. Town of Astatu-
lia, 378 So. 2d 710 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (property purchased in reliance on town
clerk's representations sufficient to vest permit).
56. E.g., Dvorson v. City of Chicago, 119 Il. App. 2d 357, 256 N.E.2d 59 (1970)
(developer secured an FHA loan); Town of Hillsborough v. Smith, 276 N.C. 48, 170
S.E.2d 904 (1968) (owner entered into contracts for construction, franchise, and dry-
cleaning equipment); Cheltenham Twp. Appeal, 413 Pa. 379, 196 A.2d 363 (1964)
(developer secured $7,500,000 construction loan, engaged a contractor, and entered
into lease agreements with prospective tenants).
57. E.g., City of Northern Miami v. Margulis, 289 So. 2d 424 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1974) (owner spent $600,000 in architect's fees, surveying costs, and preparation of
engineering data); Dvorson v. City of Chicago, 119 Mll. App. 2d 357, 256 N.E.2d 59
(1970) (developer spent $37,783 in architect's fees, examination fees, and permit fees).
58. 61 Hawaii 390, 606 P.2d 866 (1980).
59. Id. at 414, 606 P.2d at 882.
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brought the project within the doctrine of equitable estoppel.6 °
Extension of utility lines and sewer hook-ups may or may not con-
stitute substantial reliance.61 Similarly, the effect of demolition,
62
grading, 63 and excavation 64 varies from case to case. Some courts
reason that the builder can preserve his investment by adapting the
improvements to uses that will conform to the new zoning.
6 5
B. The Balance Test
By focusing on the extent of detrimental reliance, the substantial
reliance rule ignores the countervailing public interest.6 6 A change of
conditions or new information, however, may justify revocation of a
permit.67 Sensitivity to environmental and social concerns has made
60. Id at 454, 606 P.2d at 903.
61. Compare Cheltenham Twp. Appeal, 413 Pa. 379, 196 A.2d 363 (1964) (vested
right to complete entire project where developer had installed electrical and sewerage
systems) with Calabrese v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 5 Pa. Commw. 444, 291 A.2d
326 (1972) (where developer connected water and sewer lines to lots there was no
vested right to permit secured by fraud) and Friendship Builders, Inc. v. West Bran-
dywine Twp. Zoning Bd., I Pa. Commw. 25, 271 A.2d 511 (1970) (no reliance for
installation of water mains where lots did not conform to subdivision ordinance).
62. Compare Mattson v. City of Chicago, 89 Il. App.3d 411 N.E.2d (1980) (vested
right to building permit after demolition in reliance thereon); with People ex rel Shell
Oil Co. v. Town of Cicero, 1111. App. 3d 900,298 N.E.2d 9 (1968) (no right to permit
due to demolition of existing structures where developer knew town trustees were
opposed to plan).
63. Compare Williams v. Wofford, 220 Ga. 504, 149 S.E.2d 190 (1965) (grading
and excavation for footings constitutes commencement of construction for purposes
of vesting right to building permit) with Spindler Realty Corp. v. Monning, 243 Cal.
App. 2d 255, 53 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1966), cer. denied, 385 U.S. 975 (1966) (no reliance for
grading work where developer had not secured a building permit).
64. Compare Morseilles v. Hustis, 27 Ill. App. 3d 454, 325 N.E.2d 767 (1975)
(right to permit vested where developer had excavated and poured footings in reliance
thereon) with Kiges v. St. Paul, 240 Minn. 522, 62 N.W.2d 363 (1953) (excavation
without more did not amount to substantial reliance).
65. See, e.g., State ex rel Green's Bottom Sportsmen, Inc. v. St. Charles County
Bd. of Adjustment, 553 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (gun club's building permit
void ab initio where there was no showing land and improvements could not be put to
other uses); Friendship Builders, Inc. v. West Brandywine Twp. Zoning Bd., I Pa.
Commw. 25, 271 A.2d 511 (1970) (right to building permits for homes on noncon-
forming lots would not vest where developer could easily vary lot size without undue
hardship). Cf. Hodge v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of West Bradford Twp., 11 Pa.
Commw. 311, 312 A.2d 813 (1973) (city estopped to forbid expansion of mobile home
park where materials purchased could not be put to conforming use).
66. See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 4, at 651.
67. Cf. City of Hollywood v. Hollywood Beach Hotel Co., 283 So. 2d 867 (Fla.
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courts increasingly willing to consider the public welfare in the estop-
pel equation.6" Thus one line of cases balances the reliance test
against another rule: courts should not estop revocation of a permit
where to do so would defeat a policy adopted to protect the public.69
Illinois courts frequently resort to a balance approach.7° Thus, in
Nott v. Woff,7 a developer began work on a motel in a commercial
zone where zoning regulations permitted such a use. 2 After he had
retained an architect and entered into construction contracts, the city
amended its zoning ordinance to exclude the motel.73 In holding for
the developer, the court weighed the evidence of public harm that
would result from erecting the motel in a commercial zone and found
the public interest small in relation to the injury to the property own-
Dist. Ct. App. 1973), aft'dinpart, rey'dinpart, 329 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1976) (city estopped
from downzoning land and rescinding developer's permit where no showing made
that harm to general welfare required such action); Tremarco Corp. v. Garzio, 32 N.J.
448, 161 A.2d 241 (1960) (no sudden change of conditions or events confronted city
with threat to public welfare). See generaly 8 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 4, at
§ 25.157.
68. Some courts accept neighborhood opposition as a manifestation of the public
interest. See, e.g., State ex rel Green's Bottom Sportsmen, Inc. v. St. Charles County
Bd. of Adjustment, 553 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (despite lapse of sixty day
appeal period, neighboring landowners were allowed to appeal decision of zoning
board of appeals); Pittsburg v. Oakhouse Assoc., 8 Pa. Commw. 349, 301 A.2d 387
(1973) (residents afforded every opportunity to protest after statutory appeal period
had run). But see Parkridge v. City of Seattle, 89 Wash. 2d 454, 573 P.2d 359 (1978)
(en bane) (community protest not synonymous with public health, safety, and wel-
fare); Town of Largo v. Imperial Homes, 300 So. 2d 311 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (no
public interest asserted where rezoning was at behest of neighbors and not pursuant to
findings of planning commission). Cf. Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 4, at 652
n.17 (noting insofar as traditional zoning disputes are generally conflicts between pri-
vate parties, the public welfare is usually subordinated to the interests of the groups of
litigants).
69. See, e.g., Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah
1980) (applicant for subdivision approval not entitled to favorable action if munici-
pality can show compelling reason to exercise its power retroactively); Petit v. Fresno,
34 Cal. App. 3d 813, 111 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1973) (to hold that city cannot be estopped
would not hurt city but would certainly injure area residents). See also Cunningham
& Kremer, supra note 4, at 651 (zoning estoppel rule fails to consider a qualification
recognized in most discussions of the doctrine of equitable estoppel: estoppel should
not be invoked where to do so would defeat a policy adopted to protect the public).
70. See cases collected in Heeter, supra note 41, at 88 n.84.
71. 18 IM. 2d 362, 163 N.E.2d 809 (1960).
72. Id at 364, 163 N.E.2d at 810.
73. Id
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er.7 4 In Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. County of McHenry,75 the
Illinois Supreme Court held unconstitutional an ordinance requiring
a developer to prove that his proposed mobile home park was in the
public interest.76 Citing the Wolff case, the court noted that the gain
to the public would be small and the hardship to developers great if it
shifted the burden of proof on the.impact of a project that otherwise
met all the requirements for a special use permit.77
Courts in other states have adopted a balance approach as well.78
In its first vested rights case,79 the Oregon Supreme Court in Clacka-
mas County v. Holmes8" devised a comprehensive, five-step balance
test. The Oregon court considered the developer's good faith as well
as his reliance expenditures, and broke down the public welfare ques-
tion into considerations of the location, type, and cost of the pro-
ject."' The location factor showed that the project would not conflict
with long range planning in the area. The type of project under con-
sideration, a chicken processing plant, indicated the type of demands
it would make on community services and what benefits it would pro-
vide. The cost factor provided a gross estimate of the project's size.82
The court weighed these three factors against the developer's good
faith reliance expenditures, and held that the developer had acquired
a vested right to complete construction despite enactment of an in-
74. Id at 369, 163 N.E.2d at 862.
75. 41 111. 2d 77, 241 N.E.2d 454 (1968).
76. Id at 87, 241 N.E.2d at 460.
77. Id at 85, 241 N.E.2d at 459.
78. See, e.g., Almquist v. Town of Marshan, 245 N.W.2d 819 (Minn. 1980) (re-
mand for consideration of whether public interest, sought to be protected by morato-
rium adopted subsequent to application for building permit, outweighed developer's
reliance expenditures on existing ordinance); Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of
Logan, 617 P.2d 392, 396 (Utah 1980) (modifying rule which required applications for
building permits to be considered under zoning regulations in force at time of permit
by requiring a consideration of countervailing public policy reasons for amending
zoning); Dimitrov v. Carlson, 138 N.J. Super. 52, 350 A.2d 246 (1975) (site plan ap-
proval denied despite reliance on use variance secured six years earlier where town-
ships had adopted an intervening ordinance in pursuit of the public health, safety and
welfare); Winepol v. Town of Hempstead, 59 Misc. 2d 768, 300 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1969)
(upholding statute which called for balancing public and private interests in issuance
of building permits).
79. Comment, Vested Rfthts andLand Use Development, 54 OR. L. REV. 103, 105
(1975).
80. 265 Or. 193, 508 P.2d 190 (1973).
81. Id at 198, 508 P.2d at 193.
82. Id at 198-99, 508 P.2d at 193.
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terim zoning ordinance that labelled the property for residential
use.
8 3
C. The Late Vesting Rule
A final building permit is the sine qua non of a vested right to de-
velop land in California." The California courts consistently refuse
to consider liabilities incurred in reliance on the mere expectation of
a final permit as part of a developer's substantial reliance.85 They
treat reliance expenditures on grading and water permits, which rou-
tinely issue before the building permit, as made at the owner's risk.86
A developer in California cannot make an estoppel argument until
he secures all the necessary permits.8 7 Thus, a landowner in the Sea-
side-Salinas-Monterey area must get the approval of fifteen state and
regional agencies in addition to the local and county governments.
8 8
83. Id at 199, 508 P.2d at 193.
84. Raley v. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 68 Cal. App. 3d 965,
977, 137 Cal. Rptr. 699, 707 (1977) (expenditures made before the issuance of a permit
will vest a right to the permit only in an emergency situation).
85. See, e.g., id at 975, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 705 ("By issuing approvals preparatory
to a building permit, the government makes no representation that the developer will
be exempt from changing land use regulations; he must comply with the ordinances in
effect at the time he secures a building permit."); Avco Community Developers, Inc.
v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 795, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr.
386, 392 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977) (government cannot be estopped to
enforce laws in effect before a building permit issues). In fact, in Russian Hills Im-
provement Ass'n v. Board of Permit Appeals, 66 Cal. 2d 34, 423 P.2d 824, 56
Cal.Rptr 672 (1967), the court urged the city to withhold permit approval until the
last moment to allow any pending zoning changes to be approved or rejected.
Hawaii employs a similar rule. See Life of the Land, Inc. v. City Council, 61 Ha-
waii 390, 455, 606 P.2d 866, 903 (1980) ($286,345.67 in preconstruction expenditures
expended before the developers received any official assurances for their project were
immaterial and did not count toward establishing equitable estoppel).
86. See, e.g., Aries Development Co. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation
Comm'n, 48 Cal. App. 3d 534, 551, 122 Cal. Rptr. 315, 327 (1975) ("holder of [grad-
ing] permit shall proceed at his own risk . . .", citing Uniform Building Code,
§§ 7006(g), 302(a)); Spindler Realty Corp. v. Monning, 243 Cal. App. 2d 255, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 7, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 975 (1966) (owner takes a calculated risk in relying on
the grading permit).
87. See, e.g., Billings v. California Coastal Comm'n, 103 Cal. App.3d 729, 735,
163 Cal. Rptr. 288, 291 (1980) ("[u]ness the owner possesses all the necessary permits,
the mere expenditure of funds or commencement of construction does not vest any
right in the development.").
88. BOSSELMAN, supra note 33, at 83-84.
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The whole process may take over a year to complete. 9 By that time,
permits secured at the start of the process may expire or subsequent
zoning changes may void them.9"
Strict application of the late vesting rule can have harsh results.
The California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 19729' essentially
sought to suspend all development within 1,000 yards of the shore-
line.92 It contained a savings clause for coastal projects on which the
developer had performed substantial work in reliance on building
permits issued before November 1, 1972. 91 Nevertheless, the courts
applied the traditional late vesting rule to find that many of these
developers did not make substantial reliance expenditures after a
building permit issued. These builders had to seek additional permits
from the appropriate regional coastal commission. 4 The commis-
sions ultimately denied most of these applications in order to prevent
irretrievable despoilation of coastal resources during the develop-
89. In a typical case, one California developer spent eighteen months negotiating
the permit process in his community. By the end he had given up one-third of his
planned number of dwellings and the cost of the remaining units had risen by $14,000
to $30,000. INTERNAT'L COMPARATIVE LAND-USE PROGRAM, CONSERVATION FOUN-
DATION, GROPING THROUGH THE MAZE 16-19 (1977).
90. See, e.g., Russian Hills Improvement Ass'n v. Board of Permit Appeals, 66
Cal. 2d 34, 40, 423 P.2d 546, 56 Cal. Rptr. 672, 677 (1967) (builder who proceeds
before final approval of permit application runs the risk that the law might change so
as to require denial of his application).
A small minority of California cases circumvent the harsh "all permits" rule by
resorting to estoppel by privity. The acts of a local office of a state regulatory depart-
ment may work an estoppel when they are regarded as representing both local and
state interests, Citizens Suburban Co. v. Rosemont Dev. Co., 244 Cal. App. 2d 666, 53
Cal. Rptr. 551 (1966); on an agent-principal theory, Department of Pub. Works v.
Volz, 25 Cal. App. 3d 480, 102 Cal. Rptr. 107 (1972); because they represent the rights
of the same government, Lerner v. Los Angeles City Bd. of Educ., 59 Cal. 2d 382, 29
Cal. Rptr. 657 (1963); or because they have a shared identity in the public mind, id
Nevertheless, the developer who wishes to extend the privity argument to estop one
unit of government due to the prior acts of another unrelated unit will fail where the
criteria on which the first agency acted are different from those the latter must use.
See 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 18.05 (1959). See also Coastal S.W. Dev.
Corp. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comi'n, 55 Cal. App. 3d 525, 127
Cal. Rptr. 775 (1976) (a small town issues a building permit for reasons vastly differ-
ent from those of a regional conservation agency).
91. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 27000-27650 (Deering 1976) (repealed 1977,
superceded by the California Coastal Act of 1976, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30000-
30900 (Deering Supp. 1981)).
92. Id at § 27104.
93. Id at § 27404.
94. Id at s§ 27401, 27402.
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ment of a coastal land use plan.9"
D. The Pending Ordinance Rule
As attentive as the California courts are to protecting the public
welfare by delaying vesting, the courts of Pennsylvania, Washington,
and Idaho are just as predisposed toward early vesting. They employ
the pending ordinance rule which gives the developer early assur-
ances that once a building permit issues he can complete his project
without fear of being thwarted by a later amendment, unless that
amendment was pending at the time of the application. 96
In Gallagher v. Building Inspector,97 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that where developers secured a valid permit in good faith
when no zoning change was pending, the city could not later amend
the ordinance to prevent permittees from building their townhouses.
A right to the permit vested at the time of issuance, even though the
developers had incurred no expenses in reliance thereon.98
The Washington Supreme Court takes the rule in Gallagher a step
95. See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 4, at 696-710 (summarizing the case
law that this development and conservation interests created).
96. Nevertheless, the rule can be no more certain than the definition of the word
"pending." Thus in Smith v. City of Clearwater, 383 So. 2d 681 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980), the Florida District Court of Appeals held an ordinance was pending when the
appropriate administrative department begins actively pursuing it. Id at 689. Simi-
larly, where the city had merely directed the city attorney to draw up an amendment,
this was not a pending ordinance. Lhomer v. Bowen, 410 Pa. 508, 188 A.2d 747
(1963) (city could not refuse plaintiff a permit to erect a gas station on the ground that
a new zoning ordinance was pending). See generally Note, The Effects of Pending
Legislation on 4pplicationsfor Building Permits in California, 1968 U.S.F.L. REv. 124,
137-139 (discussing the rule in Pennsylvania).
97. 432 Pa. 301, 247 A.2d 572 (1968).
98. Id at 574. Pennsylvania courts only rely on the pending ordinance test to vest
a right to a permit when a developer cannot assert substantial reliance. Otherwise
they follow the majority rule. See, e.g., Friendship Builders, Inc. v. West Brandywine
Twp. Zoning Bd., 1 Pa. Commw. 25, 271 A.2d 511 (1970) (Gallagher not applicable
where developer had incurred liabilities in reliance on a permit); Penn v. Yecko Bros.,
420 Pa. 386, 217 A.2d 171 (1966) (to acquire vested rights, applicant must obtain a
valid permit in good faith and incur substantial liabilities in reliance thereon).
Since Gallagher, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has reaffirmed the sub-
stantial reliance rule. Colonial Park for Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 5
Pa. Commw. 594, 290 A.2d 719 (1972) (refusing to extend pending ordinance rule
where plaintiff argued that because he was entitled to a permit under a prior unconsti-
tutional ordinance, he should be shielded from the effect of a new ordinance requiring
larger lots).
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further. In Hull v. Hunt,99 the court ruled that the right to a permit
vests at the time of the developer's application, if the permit is there-
after issued.l °o By relating the vesting question back to the time the
application was made rather than the time the permit issued, Hull
prevents city officials from sidestepping the pending ordinance test by
delaying action on a permit application until an amendment to the
relevant zoning can be initiated.1 'O
Subsequent Washington appellate court cases retreated to the Gal-
lagher formulation by requiring that a zoning amendment be pend-
ing at the time of the permit's issuance, not the developer's
application.' 02 Nevertheless, Hull was recently reaffirmed by the
Washington Supreme Court in Mercer Enterprises, Inc. v. City of
Bremerton.0 Although the city council had not yet issued a permit
at the time of a zoning change, the Mercer court held that the plain-
tiff developer had a vested right to receive the permit because his
forty-nine acre condominium project conformed to the letter of the
law in effect at the time of his application."° The planning director
had initially withheld approval because the project did not conform
with the spirit of the law as well.'"5 Before the developer could
amend his plans, the city council passed a moratorium on processing
all applications for building permits.'
0 6
The Hull holding can be criticized for tipping the balance too far in
favor of the developer. Because a lengthy study period and public
hearings typically precede a zoning change, the alert builder can ini-
tiate applications as soon as he learns of a proposed amendment. He
99. 53 Wash. 2d 125, 331 P.2d 856 (1958)(en banc).
100. Id at 130, 331 P.2d at 859.
101. See, e.g., Russian Hills Improvement Ass'n v. Board of Permit Appeals, 66
Cal. 2d 34, 46, 56 Cal. Rptr. 672, 680-81 (1967) (court urged the city to withhold
permit approval until the last moment to allow any pending zoning changes to be
approved or rejected). -
102. See, e.g., Jones v. Town of Woodway, 70 Wash. 2d 987, 425 P.2d 904 (1967)
(refusal to apply Hull v. Hunt where plaintiff wished to subdivide previously unzoned
property into 2.5 house lots acre); Pierce v. King County, 62 Wash. 2d 324, 382 P.2d
628 (1963) (building permits secured under illegal, spot zoning ordinance not pro-
tected from revocation by Hull v. Hunt); Rogers v. City of Toppenish, 23 Wash. App.
554, 596 P.2d 1096 (1979) (municipality liable for damages to real estate broker who
bought land in reliance on inaccurate zoning information).
103. 93 Wash. 2d 624, 611 P.2d 1237 (1980) (en banc).
104. Id at 628, 611 P.2d at 1239.
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can thereby avoid complying with what may well be compelling pub-
lic policies. In view of this perceived deficiency, the Utah Supreme
Court recently modified its version of the Hull rule to allow the city
to show compelling reasons for exercising its zoning power retroac-
tively to the application date. In Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of
Logan,"°7 the Utah court endorsed the pending ordinance rule but
expressed concern that the Hull formulation affords no protection to
intervening public interests that may be compromised by the planned
private undertaking.'08 Nevertheless, it refused to find the public in-
terest controlling where the city rejected the developer's subdivision
application due to inadequate access for police and fire protection,




Zoning is based on uniformity of use within each district. A
change in zoning may render existing uses nonconforming. In the
interests of preserving neighborhood character within a district, these
uses must terminate."' An abrupt prohibition, however, would con-
stitute a taking and require the municipality to pay just compensa-
tion."' Instead a municipality amortizes" 2 such uses, allowing the
owner to maintain his use for a period of time in order to permit a
reasonable recovery of his investment. 113 The owner may not, how-
107. 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980).
108. Id at 395.
109. Id at 396.
110. See MANDELKER, supra note 17, at 209 (discussing the assumption that mix-
ing incompatible uses should be avoided).
111. ". . .nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compen-
sation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
112. The term corresponds roughly to the accounting process by which funds are
set aside or liabilities gradually extinguished. The idea is to let an owner get the
useful life out of a structure to fulfill his investment expectations. The technique has
a logical appeal but courts rarely bother to determine with any certainty the true
remaining useful life of a structure. See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 4, at 673
n.190; Note, Removal of Nonconforming Uses: Amortization, 59 CAL. L. REV. 242
(1971). See also Comment, Zoning-Priniples of Retroactivity and Amortization of the
Nonconforming Use-A Paradox in Property Law, 4 VILL. L. REv. 416, 417 (1959)
(amortization as an acceptable substitute for compensation).
113. Structures are given preferential treatment since they represent a more irre-
coverable investment than open space uses such as farms or drive-in theaters. See
Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42 (1958) (possible to allow
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ever, make any new investment in the use. 114
A structure must be "in use" before it can achieve nonconforming
use status." 5 Nevertheless, a court may determine that a developer
has a vested right to complete a project despite an intervening change
of zoning where termination of his project in mid-stream would cause
the developer to lose his reliance investment. The developer is thus
allowed to create a nonconforming use ab initio. 116 Similarly, courts
employ a recovery of investment analysis when they uphold revoca-
tion of a permit if the developer can put his investment to a use that
conforms to the new zoning.117 Under either analysis, the result is
the same: a developer achieves immunity from subsequent changes
in zoning due to his prior investment."l 8
Some courts perceive the underlying similarity between the non-
conforming use and completion right doctrines." 9 Thus when a de-
veloper completes some stages of a large project before a change in
zoning, a court may sever the finished parts from the integrated plan
and declare them nonconforming uses. 120 This preserves those parts
from the retroactive effect of a new ordinance. Despite the possibility
property owner's cooperage business while abating his outdoor storage use). See also
MANDELKER, supra note 17, at 295.
114. Thus, an owner may not make repairs, Selligman v. Von Ailmen Bros., 297
Ky. 121, 179 S.W.2d 207 (1944) (plaintiffs forbidden by ordinance from constructing
brick walls to replace rotted wooden ones in nonconforming dairy operation); nor
may he extend a nonconforming use, Martin v. Cestone, 33 N.J. Super. 267, 110 A.2d
54 (1954) (owner could not extend nonconforming use of one lot for outdoor storage
to his other lots). Furthermore, abandonment for a statutory period extinguishes a
nonconforming use. State ex rel Peterson v. Burt, 42 Wis. 2d 284, 166 N.W.2d 207
(1969) (city did not have to prove intent to abandon where ordinance provided for
relinquishment of nonconforming use if discontinued for more than one year).
115. See Anderson v. City Council, 229 Cal. App. 2d 79, 40 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1964)
(activity of owner and not his intentions determines the use of his property at the time
of a zoning change); 8 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 4, at § 25.188.
116. 4 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 111.03 (1974) (building
in the face of a zoning change is the creation of a nonconforming use).
117. See note 65 and accompanying text supra.
118. See MANDELKER,supra note 17, at 294-95 (no justification for treating estab-
lished nonconforming uses differently or more favorably than potentially noncon-
forming uses).
119. See, e.g., Clackamas County v. Holmes, 265 Or. 193, 197, 508 P.2d 190, 192
(1973) (allowance of nonconforming use applies to uses in various stages of develop-
ment as well as those actually in existence at the time of a zoning change); County of
San Diego v. McClurken, 37 Cal. 2d 683, 234 P.2d 972 (1951) (similarity between the
two doctrines discussed).
120. But see notes 122-27 and accompanying text infra.
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of merging the two doctrines, however, most courts observe a rigid
separation between existing and planned uses. 2 '
V. THE PROJECT APPROACH
Finally, courts modify the zoning estoppel rule to accommodate
the problems of a large-scale development by treating the entire pro-
ject as a single entity.122 In such a case, once a permit issues for a
part of the project the rest follows automatically. The normal sub-
stantial reliance and public welfare considerations apply, but courts
also consider the fact that a development is planned, financed, and
represented to the city as a unified project.'23
In In re Diamond's Appeal, 24 the developer had a vested right to
complete all stages of his multi-unit housing/commercial develop-
ment where he had planned it as an integrated whole.' 25 Adjacent
landowners who were silent when the housing permits were issued
could not appeal the subsequent issuance of commercial permits as a
means of attacking the entire project.' 26 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court said "[t]o allow complex comprehensive development plans for
development of as large a tract as is here involved to be attacked on a
piece-by-piece basis would result in the greatest of inequities to the
developers."' 127
121. Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 4, at 671.
122. See generally, Delaney & Kominers, supra note 52.
123, See, e.g., Mercer Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Bremerton, 93 Wash. 2d 624, 611
P.2d 1237 (1980) (en bane) (planning department's approval process for site plan of
project, all negotiations treated project as a whole); Murrell v. Wolff, 408 S.W.2d 842
(Mo. 1966) (city officials knew of and acquiesced in developer's project as an inte-
grated whole); Telimar Homes, Inc. v. Miller, 14 A.D.2d 586,218 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1961)
(developer repeatedly made known to town planning board and zoning commission
that he purchased tract for a single, unified development). But see, Oceanic Califor-
nia, Inc. v. North Central Coast Regional Comm'n, 63 Cal. App. 3d 57, 133 Cal. Rptr.
664 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 95 (1977) (specifically rejected project approach).
124. 413 Pa. 379, 196 A.2d 363 (1964).
125. Single use, residential tract developments generally do not fare as well as
mixed use projects. Stages that haven't reached the point of completion beyond
which improvements can not be equally utilized in conformance with the new zoning
classification may be denied a vested right. See, e.g., Town of Lebanon v. Woods, 115
Conn. 182, 215 A.2d 112 (1965) (vested right to part of project so close to completion
as to be considered "in use," no vested right to smaller lot size where improvements
could be put to new lot size after zoning change). See Delaney & Kominers, supra
note 52 at 243-48.
126. 413 Pa. at 392, 196 A.2d at 369.
127. Id at 394, 196 A.2d at 370.
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Courts use the project approach in an adhoc way to grant a devel-
oper just so much relief as they feel he merits. In Henry & Murphy,
Inc. v. Town of Allenstown, 28 subdividers recorded a plat for fifty
duplex house lots. The town amended the ordinance to require
larger, single family lots, but did not attempt to enforce the change
for some time.'2 9 After the developer sold thirty-four of the substan-
dard lots, the city attempted to enforce the new lot size.' 30 The New
Hampshire Supreme Court found that the amendment would reduce
the number of remaining lots from sixteen to four, the price of which
would be uncompetitive in the neighborhood. 3 ' The court held that
the developers had a vested right to the smaller lots for the entire
project.' 32 Nevertheless, the court would not extend the project ap-




Courts struggle to adopt the equitable estoppel, vested rights doc-
trine to accommodate the realities of the modem large-scale develop-
ment without jeopardizing the public welfare. They can only address
the problem after a dispute arises between a developer and a regula-
tory body, however. Government itself can address the root of the
problem by rationalizing the permit process by which it discharges its
duty to protect the public welfare.
A state can amend its planning and zoning enabling act to establish
the point in the development process at which a right to a building
permit vests.' 34 A less comprehensive alternative is to draft a savings
128. 120 N.H. 910, 424 A.2d 1132 (1980).
129. Id. at 911, 424 A.2d at 1133.
130. Id at 912, 424 A.2d at 1133.
131. Id. at 914, 424 A.2d at 1134.
132. Id. at 914, 424 A.2d at 1135.
133. Id
134. This would relieve the courts of choosing between tests that emphasize differ-
ent policies by establishing criteria for courts to apply to the facts of each case. See,
ag., MASS. GEN. LAWS. AN. ch. 40A, § 6 (West Supp. 1977) (vested right to permit
at time of application or issuance); 1968 PA. LAWS, Act No. 247 § 505(4) (applicant
entitled to decision based on ordinances in effect at time of application). See also
Rockshire Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Mayor & Council of Rockville, 32 Md. App. 22, 358
A.2d 570 (1976) (savings clause in intervening legislation provided that previously
approved applications continue in full force and effect); Comparo v. Township of
Woodbridge, 91 N.J. Super. 585, 589, 222 A.2d 28, 30 (1966) (subsequent amendment
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clause into any regulatory measure that requires a permit. 135 The
effect in either case would be to treat affected projects as noncon-
forming uses.
136
Using another approach, Vermont consolidates the permit process
itself by bringing together in a single application all the requirements
for five of the agencies whose approval a developer must secure
before starting construction. 137 A less comprehensive variation of
this approach is the "permit register." A permit register collects the
requirements of pertinent government agencies in a central office.
Developers who must comply with more than one permit may re-
quest a joint hearing. Rather than individual hearings on each per-
mit, a panel of agency representatives convenes and makes a certified
record on which the agencies must base their permit decisions.
138
Another legislative technique mandates a statute of limitations for
permit decisions. Where an agency fails to act on an application in a
specified number of days, the project acquires presumptive
approval.1
39
As a final solution, one writer suggests totally eliminating building
permits. Instead, a builder could create any sort of a development he
chose but, like a manufacturer of an unsafe automobile, he would be
exempted permits from effects of previous zoning change). See generally 8 E. Mc-
QUILLIN, supra note 4, at § 25.156.
135. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 27404 (Deering 1976) (repealed January 1,
1977) (exempted from requirements of the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act
projects for which developer had performed substantial work on a permit issued
before November 8, 1972).
136. See notes 122-28 and accompanying text supra.
137. See generally BOSSELMAN, supra note 33, at 22; Senecal, Regulatory Coordi-
nation in Vermont, in URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, THIRTEEN PERSPECTIVES ON REGU-
LATORY SIMPLIFICATION 55 (1979) [hereinafter cited as URBAN LAND INSTITUTE].
138. See, e.g., MODEL CODE, supra note 36, §§ 2-401, -402 (permit register and
joint hearing provisions); see also, San Francisco Planning & Urban Renewal Ass'n,
v. Central Permit Bureau, 30 Cal. App. 3d 920, 106 Cal. Rptr. 670 (1973) (central
permit bureau coordinates application review); Washington Environmental Coordi-
nation Procedures Act of 1973 § 6, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 90.62.060 (Supp. 1981)
(joint hearing procedure).
139. See, e.g., MEDICAL CODE, upra note 36, at § 2-403(5) (presumptive approval
if agency fails to comment in a specified time); 19 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 863.18
(West 1962 & Supp. 1981) (presumptive approval in no action in forty-five days);
Vermont State Land Use Development Plan Act of 1969, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 6086(b) (and-ten days); Washington Environmental Coordination Procedure Act
of 1973 § 4, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.62.040 (Supp. 1981) (and-fifteen days).
1982]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
liable in tort for any resulting harm.140 This is not as farfetched as it
sounds. New York currently has a law allowing a developer to post a
bond as security against environmental damage rather than requiring
him to seek a permit.1
41
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
All things considered, it is not unfair to say that in attempting to
reach just results in applying the vested rights doctrine, courts pick
the'test that fits their notions of due process and fair play,142 empha-
sizing facts that support the desired conclusion.' 43 The quality of the
resulting decisional law is uneven. The outcome of any given case is
uncertain since courts manipulate the tests they have developed to
reach decisions that are fair both to the developer and to the pub-
lic.'" Even the pending ordinance rule, which purports to promote
certainty and reduce litigation, requires judicial analysis to determine
140. Babcock, The Permit Explosion: The Final Solution, in URBAN LAND INSTI-
TuTE, supra note 137, at 141-44.
141. N.Y. ElNviR. CONSERV. LAW § 17-1501 (McKinney Supp. 1977).
142. See, e.g., Western Land Equities Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah
1980) (bad faith for city to reject application for the very project that triggered zoning
reconsideration); Largo v. Imperial Homes, 398 So. 2d 571 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
("estoppel is nothing more than fair play"); Gallagher v. Building Inspector, 432 Pa.
301, 306-07, 247 A.2d 572, 574 (1968) (the civil law frowns on making illegal that
which the law has already recognized as legal).
143. See note 51 supra. Most courts measure reliance against the total project
cost. See Aries Development Corp. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation
Comn'n, 48 Cal. App. 3d 534, 122 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975) (grading cost was
$2,263,333); Town of Hempstead v. Lynn, 32 Misc. 2d 312, 222 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1961)
($15,600 de minimis where total project cost estimated to be $400,000).
Other courts gauge the extent of reliance expenditures by their impact on the devel-
oper's financial ability. See, e.g., Friendship Builders, Inc. v. West Brandywine Twp.
Zoning Bd., I Pa. Comnw. 25, 271 A.2d 511 (1970) (financial hardship to builder not
great).
One Florida court even found substantial reliance by comparing the developer's
outlay to the city's annual budget. Project Home, Inc. v. Town of Astatula, 373 So. 2d
710 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) ($8,300 substantial because it was more than the town's
entire annual budget).
144. See, e.g., Henry & Murphy, Inc. v. Town of Allenstown, 120 N.Y. 910, 424
A.2d 1132 (1980) (developers found to have a vested right to previously approved lot
size, but denied a vested right to previously approved multi-family use); Jayne Es-
tates, Inc. v. Raynor, 22 N.Y.2d 417, 239 N.E.2d 713, 293 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1968) (tor-
tured use of variance to allow owner to continue use already begun in violation of
existing zoning). Cf. Note,4dministrative Discretion in Zoning, 82 HARv. L. REV. 668
(1969) (noting the overwhelming number of variances approved).
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when an ordinance is "pending."' 145 Since some litigation is inevita-
ble over when a right to develop land vests, an administrative body
which applies statutory criteria in formal adjudicatory hearings may
be a better forum.1
46
The building permit is a necessary administrative tool for the pro-
tection of the public welfare. 147 The growth of single purpose agen-
cies whose regulatory shadows fall on some phase of development
may be a healthy response to public demands for a better living envi-
ronment. The resulting unpredictability and delay, however, is not
necessary. 1
48
Legislative attempts to simplify and coordinate the approval pro-
cess are welcome additions to the vested rights conundrum. Consoli-
dation of the permit process represents a desireable evolution in the
administration of land use regulations. Codifying criteria for deter-
mining when a development right vests may conflict with the flex-
ibility that characterizes the equitable principles courts often use in
vested rights cases. Nevertheless, statutory guidelines provide a de-
gree of certainty not available under the former approach. As con-
struction projects increase in size and complexity, requiring a
concomitant increase in the commitment of capital, that trade-off
may become necessary.
Timothy E. DePalma
145. See note 96 and accompanying text supra.
146. Thus, in Vermont subdivison approval is in the hands of nine district envi-
ronmental review boards that apply ten statutory criteria to permit applications. The
boards hold public hearings and make decisions in a quasi-judicial manner with in-
terested agencies and the developer in adversarial roles. Proceedings are conducted
according to Vermont's Administrative Procedures Act.
147. See note I 1 and accompanying text supra.
148. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
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